Abstract. One of the great strengths of public-key cryptography is its potential to allow the localization of trust. This potential is greatest when cryptography is present to guarantee data integrity rather than secrecy, and where there is no natural hierarchy of trust. Both these conditions are typically fulfilled in the commercial world, where CSCW requires sharing of data and resources across organizational boundaries. One property which trust is frequently assumed or "proved" to have is transitivity (if A trusts B and B trusts C then A trusts C) or some generalization of transitivity such as *-closure. We use the loose term unintensional transitivity of trust to refer to a situation where B can effectively put things into A's set of trust assumptions without A's explicit consent (or sometimes even awareness.) Any account of trust which allows such situations to arise clearly poses major obstacles to the effective confinement (localization) of trust. In this position paper, we argue against the need to accept unintensional transitivity of trust. We distinguish the notion of trust from a number of other (transitive) notions with which it is frequently confused, and argue that "proofs" of the unintensional transitivity of trust typically involve unpalatable logical assumptions as well as undesirable consequences.
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The Need for Trust
Principals engaging in a security protocol often require justification for doing so. They must be able to prove that they are "entitled" to take the visible actions which they do on the basis of their own individual (and possibly highly private) policies. In order to prove this, they will typically need to make explicit "trust assumptions" about other parties participating in the protocol. Trust is then used as a substitute for knowledge in order to demonstrate that the protocol has the security properties that the principal desires. Theories of knowledge typically endow knowledge with a strong form of inter-subjective agreement often mis-deseribed as "objectivity". But unlike knowledge, trust is strongly subject-dependent.
The confinement or localization of trust is desirable in order to allow a principal to contain the risk that her participation in the protocol actually endows her system with additional properties which she urgently desires it not to have.
Unwanted secret-sharing must be assumed transitive in any sensible threat model. One of the great strengths of public-key cryptography is its potential to allow the localization of trust, since it does not require any secrets to be shared. This potential is greatest when cryptography is present to guarantee data integrity rather than their secrecy, and where there is no natural hierarchy of trust. Both these conditions are typically satisfied in the commercial world, where CSCW requires sharing of data and resources across organizational boundaries.
Trust is an elusive concept, however. Many treatments of security attempt to take trust as a primitive with postulated properties, and derive consequences. One property frequently postulated or "derived" is some form of transitivity. In the simplest case (writing "A trusts B" as shorthand for "A trusts B about X under certain conditions") we allegedly have:
If: A trusts B .&, B trusts C :then. A trusts C frequently written with the addition of the sentiment "whether A is aware of the fact or not". We use the loose term m~intensional transitivity of trust to refer to a situation in which B can act in such a way as to put things into A's set of trust assumptions without A's explicit consent (or sometimes even A's awareness.) Acceptance of any account of trust which allows such situations to arise clearly poses major obstacles to the effective confinement (localization) of trust.
In this position paper, we argue against accepting the unintensional transitivity of trust. We first distinguish the notion of trust from a number of other (transitive) notions with which it is frequently confused. We then argue that apparent unintensional transitivity of trust is typically an artifact of deploying unpalatable logical assumptions.
Some Things W'hich Trust is Not
Trust is not Reliance. Many statements ostensibly about trust make better sense if "trusts" is replaced by ':relies upon". For example, I may be required to have my software certified by the QA department, which they do by running known ~ests on their hardware. Or I may be required to submit a transaction authorization which has been cryptographically signed by a particular guardian on a smart card. in both cases I rely (or depend) upon the other parties to do what is required of them. I cannot complete my part of the task unless they do theirs, and I cannot exercise any control over what they do (or don't do). But this does not mean that I trust them. I can va.lidate all their actions, by re-running the tests on my own hardware, or by checking the signature, before I commit to my part of the transaction. I must rely upon them, but I need not trust them.
Trust is not Trustworthiness. We distinguish statements of the form ';A trusts B" from statements about trustworthiness, such as:
A believes. B is trustworthy
